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Abstract: The paper examines the empirical relationship between financial development and economic 
growth for five South Asian countries over the time period 1990-2015 using both panel model approach 
and time series analysis. We employ multiple proxies for financial development, namely, foreign direct 
investment, total debt service, gross domestic savings, domestic credit to private sector by banks and 
domestic credit provided by financial sector to test the relationship. The panel model results indicate 
that there is an overall positive association between finance and growth for South Asia through the FDI 
and savings channels. The country-specific analyses suggest that the growth effects of financial 
channels are most pronounced in Sri Lanka whereas, on the other hand, financial development plays no 
role in the Indian growth process in the short run. Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan lie somewhere in 
between this spectrum with every country exhibiting unique growth paths which highlights the 
heterogeneity of the region.    
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 1. Introduction 
The theory of finance led growth is well established in the growth and development literature. 
The main proposition of the theory is that financial intermediation through efficient markets or 
banking system can improve the allocation of resources in an economy, especially the capital 
allocation for productive projects, which, in turn, promotes production and faster economic 
growth (Estrada, et al., 2010). However, financial development is a multi-dimensional concept 
and there are multiple channels through which it can influence growth. It is quite possible that, 
as our findings predict, a specific channel such as FDI or Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 
is operative in one country but not in the other. Consequently, the nature of the finance-growth 
relationship may differ from country to country. This heterogeneity of channels of finance led 
growth has been relatively less studied for South Asia.  
Most of the existing evidence on the finance-growth nexus has been generated from the 
developed economies, where the financial markets and banking systems are already on a 
relatively higher development stage (Levine, 2005). On the other hand, for the developing 
countries, the causality between growth and financial development may not be so pronounced 
because of underdeveloped financial markets. Consequently, there has been relatively less 
research done for developing countries, especially for the South Asian economies, on this issue 
(see Section 2.2.1 for details).  
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one study (Rana and Barua, 2015) which 
attempts to explore the relationship for South Asia. Moreover, there exists no previous study 
which tries to highlight the heterogeneity in South Asia, as far as the finance-growth association 
is concerned. From a policy perspective, conducting the latter research is important because 
there are a few limitations of cross-country and panel studies. Panel model estimates mask vital 
cross-country differences and at best show an average relationship for the sample of countries 
and thus, often do not correspond to country-specific estimates (Levine and Zervos, 1996 and 
Luintel and Khan, 2004). Pesaran and Smith (1995) also point out the heterogeneity of 
coefficients across countries. Moreover, as Levine (2003) says, it is difficult to establish the 
direction of causality between different financial variables and growth through panel analysis.  
Hence, it can be argued that generalisations based on panel estimates may provide incorrect 
inferences for most countries of the panel which, in turn, may impair the policy relevance of 
such results.  
Given this backdrop, the current paper utilises both panel model as well as time series 
approaches as the latter may provide deeper insight on the issue since all these economies 
(Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) are on different growth levels and 
trajectories. The current paper makes two specific contributions: Firstly, it extends the thin 
literature on the average relationship between finance and economic growth in the context of 
South Asia, by examining the same over the time period 1990-2015 using a panel model 
approach; secondly, this is one of the earliest investigations of country specific finance led 
growth paths for South Asian countries by employing Granger causality approach. The findings 
of the paper suggest that the region is quite heterogeneous, and one size fit all policy does not 
hold good for the member nations.    
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature in this 
area, Section 3 is dedicated to model formulation and variable description, Section 4 presents 
the econometric results along with discussion and, finally, Section 5 concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
2 Review of the Literature 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
 
In this section, we will briefly review the specific channels which can lead to growth. There 
are two basic components of a financial system, one, the traditional financial intermediaries or 
the banking system, and two, the direct finance mode or the stock and bond markets. The more 
efficient a financial system is, the better is the allocation of resources which, in turn, increases 
return on investments, leading to faster capital accumulation and eventually rapid economic 
growth (Estrada et al., 2010).   
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) emphasise mainly on the reduction of the information and 
transaction costs via financial intermediation and say that the five core functions of a financial 
system are to:  
i) Ex-ante information production for the investments and thus resulting in capital allocation; 
ii) Ex post monitoring of the investments to mitigate bad debts or moral hazard issues;  
iii) Diversification of funds hence managing risk;  
iv) Mobilising and pooling saving; and  
v) Reducing the transaction costs hence easing the exchange of goods and services. 
Financial institutions reduce the cost of processing information and help in the allocation of 
funds towards most profitable investments. Without such institutions, it would have been costly 
for the investors to acquire information about firms, managers and market conditions. Thus, 
improvement of information leads to efficient allocation of funds towards the most productive 
firms thereby increasing the return on investments and accelerating the rate of economic growth 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). An efficient financial system also affects growth positively 
through the technological advancement channel. For instance, financial intermediaries may 
promote innovation in an economy by channelising funds to those entrepreneurs who are most 
likely to engage in product or process innovation (Blackburn and Hung, 1998).  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) argue that better monitoring by the banks may create a 
better corporate governance mechanism in the firms which may help in reducing the bad debt 
problem. Bencivenga and Smith (1993) also show that financial intermediaries that improve 
corporate governance will reduce credit rationing and thereby lift productivity and economic 
growth.  
Financial instruments, namely, derivatives, SWAPS, options and various combinations of them 
can in principle diversify risk, or hedge risk for investors and firms, thus promoting more trade. 
Pooling of funds and savings may also perform a critical role in the growth process. Financial 
systems that are more effective at pooling the savings of individuals can fund a larger number 
of large-scale investments which leads to better exploitation of economies of scale thereby 
affecting economic growth positively. An efficient mobilisation of savings can also lead to 
better allocation of resources and accelerate innovation.  
Finally, there is a strong consensus in the growth literature that specialisation promotes 
learning-by-doing and boosts productivity and is therefore beneficial for economic 
development (see, for example, McKinnon, 1973; North, 1981). However, the higher the 
specialisation the higher will be the number of transactions which are costly. Financial markets 
that can lower these transaction costs will facilitate deeper specialisation thereby leading to 
faster growth.  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence  
There exists a vast gamut of literature which examines the association between the two 
variables and also tries to identify the particular channels through which financial development 
leads to higher growth. Broadly speaking, the literature can be classified into the following 
strands: cross-country studies, time series, panel investigations and industry or firm level 
studies (Levine, 2005).  
One of the earliest studies in this area was by Goldsmith (1969) who shows a positive 
correlation between financial development and the level of economic activity using data on 35 
countries. The seminal paper of King and Levine (1993a) builds on Goldsmith’s work. Using 
data on 77 countries for the period 1960-1989, King and Levine observe a positive and 
significant relationship between financial development and long-run growth. King and Levine 
(1993b) examine the finance-growth nexus for 80 countries over the time period 1960-1989 
and report that various measures of financial development are strongly associated with 
economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that financial development reduces costs of 
external finances to firms and consequently industrial sectors develop faster in those countries 
which have more developed financial markets. Atje and Jovanovic (1993) report a positive 
relationship between stock market development and growth in economic activity. Levine and 
Zervos (1998) construct numerous measures of stock market development to assess the 
relationship between stock market development and growth in a sample of 42 countries over 
the period 1976–1993. They report that stock market development affects growth positively. 
Estrada et al. (2010) examine the relationship for a sample of 92 countries using total liquid 
liabilities, bank credit and stock market capitalisation as proxies for financial depth. The paper 
finds that financial development has a robust and positive impact on growth and furthermore, 
there is no evidence of significant differences between developing countries and industrialised 
countries in terms of the finance–growth nexus. 
 On the other hand, there exists a set of studies which report a lack of any significant 
relationship between finance and growth or even report a negative relationship. Utilising data 
on 85 countries for the period 1960-1990, Berthélemy and Varoudakis (1997) report a negative 
relationship between financial depth and growth. In contrast with Atje and Jovanovic (1993), 
Harris (1997) finds no hard evidence that the level of stock market activity helps to explain the 
growth in per capita output. Thus, it could probably be asserted that the overall empirical 
evidence on the finance-growth relationship, especially in the context of panel or cross-country 
studies, is inconclusive. 
There are a few problems with cross-country and panel estimations. Firstly, such studies report 
an average relationship between financial development and growth and do not take the 
individual country characteristics into account. This approach is acceptable if the relationship 
does not vary significantly across countries (Demetriades and Andrianova, 2003). However, if 
the relationship is driven by one or two ‘outliers’ then such results would be inappropriate for 
non-outlier countries from a policy perspective. In other words, such studies will not be suitable 
for effective policy prescriptions. For instance, Zhu, Ash and Pollin (2002) show that the 
Levine-Zervos finding, that stock market liquidity affects GDP growth positively, is not robust 
to alternative specifications. Once the ‘East-Asian Tigers’ are excluded from the sample, the 
growth effect of stock market liquidity disappears. Secondly, it is hard to determine the 
directions of causality. Therein lies the importance of time series studies.  
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), one of the earlier time series studies in this field, examine 
the finance-growth relationship for 16 countries for the period 1960-1990. The study reports 
that the direction of causality varies considerably across countries. While there is bi-directional 
causality in seven countries, there is also evidence of reverse causality in six cases (El Salvador, 
Greece, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa and Turkey). Odedokun (1996) show that the growth-
promoting effects of financial intermediation are more pronounced in low-income than in high-
income less-developed countries. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) report a negative 
relationship between financial development and growth in 12 Latin American countries during 
the time period 1950-1985. Rioja and Valev (2004) show that the nature of the relationship 
between financial development and growth vary according to the level of the former. They 
suggest that there are three distinct regions of financial development. In the low region 
(countries with very low levels of financial development), improvements in financial markets 
have an ambiguous effect on growth. In the intermediate region, the effect is large and positive 
whereas in the high region the effect is positive but smaller.  
 
2.2.1 Evidence from South Asia 
 
There exist a few studies which attempt to examine the finance-growth link in the context of 
South Asian countries.  Rana and Barua (2015) examine the finance-growth link for the five 
developing South Asian economies of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka for 
the time period 1974-2012. Using, domestic credit provided by financial sector, total debt 
services, gross domestic savings,  broad money and trade balance as proxies for financial 
development, they find that growth of total debt services and domestic savings have a 
significant impact on economic development of these countries. Singh (2008) examines the 
relationship for India for the period 1951–52 to 1995–96 and reports a bi-directional causality 
between the two. Ray (2013) also reports a positive and significant effect of financial 
development on the economic growth of India. Applying Johansen cointegration and error 
correction modelling technique, Perera and Paudel (2009) conclude that there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that financial development affects economic growth positively in Sri 
Lanka. Khan et al. (2015) examine the empirical relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in Pakistan over the period 1971–2004 and find that economic growth is 
an outcome of the former. 
From the above discussion, it can be inferred that there is very limited empirical work (both 
time series and panel studies) on the financial development-economic growth relationship in 
the context of the South Asian countries. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no study 
which has previously identified the nature of heterogeneity in the South Asian countries. This 
study, therefore, aims to extend the literature in this direction.  
 
3. Model specification and Variable Description  
In order to test the finance-growth relationship, we adopt the augmented Solow model proposed 
by Mankiw et al. (1992). The model can be expressed as follows: 
GDPit = β0+ β1Tradeit + β2PCapitalit + β3HCapitalit + β4Labourit + eit   (1) 
where, for country ‘i’ at time ‘t’, 
‘GDP’ represents Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate (constant 2010 US$), ‘Trade’ 
denotes trade openness which is calculated as (exports+imports as % of GDP), ‘Pcapital’ is a 
proxy for physical capital stock which is Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), ‘Hcapital’ 
is average years of schooling which acts a proxy for human capital stock, ‘Labour’ is the size 
of the labour force and e is the error term. 
We augment Equation (1) with several proxies for financial development as well as a lagged 
dependent variable to control for any potential autocorrelation problem. The econometric 
model used in the panel model analysis looks as follows: 
GDPit = β0+β1L.GDPit+β2Tradeit+β3PCapitalit+β4HCapitalit+β5Labourit+β6Financeit+eit  (2) 
 where, ‘L.GDP’ is the lagged dependent variable and ‘Finance’ denotes the 5 proxies for 
financial development used in this study namely: 
i) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 
ii) Total debt service (% of GNI), 
iii) Gross domestic savings (% of GDP), 
iv) Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) and 
v) Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) 
All the variables in our model have been expressed in their natural logarithms. The sample 
includes the five South Asian countries of Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
The time period under consideration is from 1990 till 2015. Earlier years could not be 
incorporated in the analysis because of data unavailability for some of the South Asian 
countries.  
In addition to the aforementioned proxy variables, we re-estimated Equation (2) using 
‘Branches of commercial banks per 1,000 km2’ and ‘Outstanding loans with commercial banks 
(% of GDP)’ as alternative finance variables. However, data on these two variables were only 
available from 2004 onwards which is inappropriate for a times series analysis. Furthermore, 
these 2 variables did not seem to exert any significant influence on growth when we examined 
the finance-growth link using panel model approach. So, we dropped these two variables from 
the study.3 Data on all the variables in our model (except, that on Branches of commercial 
banks and Outstanding loans with commercial banks which come from IMF Financial Access 
Survey)  have been obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016).  
The econometric analysis has been conducted at two levels. Firstly, we investigate for an 
average relationship between financial development and economic growth for entire South 
Asia by employing panel model approach. We start by estimating Equation (2) using a fixed 
effects model but we find the problem of autocorrelation in the estimates. Hence, we re-
estimate using Feasible Generalised Squares (FGSL) method. FGLS method allows estimation 
in the presence of first-order autocorrelation within panels, heteroskedasticity or cross-
sectional correlation across panels (Beck and Katz, 1995).  
Secondly,  we re-examine the finance-growth nexus (see Equations 3-8 below) for each country 
using Vector Autoregression (VAR) method and Granger Causality approach. The aim of doing 
the time series analysis is twofold: firstly, it allows us to highlight the heterogeneity in South 
Asia, as far as the finance-growth link is concerned and, secondly, it aids in determining the 
direction of causality between the two variables for each country. As discussed in Section 2, 
there are a few limitations of panel studies. If the nature of association between finance and 
growth varies across countries in the sample, running a panel regression will not highlight these 
differences. Consequently, such “general” results cannot be used to provide policy prescription 
for a particular country. In this respect, time-series analysis provides a much better insight 
(Chatterji et al., 2014).  
The VAR system of equations, that we estimate, can be presented as follows: 
GDPit = β0+β1Tradeit+β2PCapitalit+β3HCapitalit+β4Labourit+β5Financeit+e1it   (3) 
Tradeit= α0+ α1GDPit+ α2PCapitalit+ α3HCapitalit+ α4Labourit+ α5Financeit+e2it   (4) 
PCapitalit= µ0+ µ1GDPit+ µ2Tradeit+ µ3HCapitalit+ µ4Labourit+ µ5Financeit+e3it   (5) 
HCapitalit= Ω0+ Ω1GDPit+ Ω2Tradeit+ Ω3PCapitalit+ Ω4Labourit+ Ω5Financeit+e4it   (6)  
Labourit= π0+ π1GDPit+ π2Tradeit+ π3PCapitalit+ π4HCapitalit+ π5Financeit+e5it   (7) 
                                                          
3 Results are available upon request.  
Financeit= σ0+ σ1GDPit+ σ2Tradeit+ σ3PCapitalit+ σ4HCapitalit+ σ5Labourit+e6it   (8)  
 
where, e1it to e6it are the error terms; number of lags=2 
We estimate Equations 3-8 for each country and for each of the 5 financial variables which 
enter the VAR system separately. On the basis of the VAR estimations, we then calculate the 
short-run Granger causality between each financial variable and growth for all the countries in 
our sample.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 provides results for the Fixed effect estimation results (see Equation 2) for the five 
economies in the South Asia.  
 
Table 1: Panel Fixed Effects Model Results, 1990-2015 
Independent Variable Coefficients 
Constant 0.709* 1.107** 0.697 0.680 0.572 
L1.GDP 0.034 0.029 0.011 0.036 0.035 
Trade 0.067 0.114** 0.057 0.102** 0.096* 
Pcapital -0.010 0.002 -0.050 0.005 0.003 
Hcapital 0.109 0.108 0.572 0.271 0.287 
Labour -0.019 -0.016 0.007 -0.017 -0.015 
Inward FDI (% of GDP) 0.140***     
Total debt service (% of 
GNI) 
 -0.141    
Gross domestic savings 
(% of GDP) 
  0.516***   
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of 
GDP) 
   0.030  
Domestic credit provided 
by financial sector (% of 
GDP) 
    0.056 
Ramsey RESET Test 
 
 
Wooldridge Test  
0.52 
 
 
0.00 
0.40 
 
 
0.00 
0.32 
 
 
0.02 
 
0.38 
 
 
0.00 
0.57 
 
 
0.00 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors have been used. All regressions include time trend. The 
mean variance inflation factor (vif) values are considerably lower than 10 for each of the estimating equations 
which confirm the absence of any multicollinearity problem. The last row reports the P-values of the tests.  
 We find no significant impact of the lagged GDP on the current growth rate, though the signs 
of the regression coefficients are all positive, which means an insignificant positive impact on 
the current growth rate. There is a large literature which theorises trade as an important 
macroeconomic channel through which developing economies may develop on their growth 
paths. The obtained results lend some support to that literature since we find significant and 
positive impact of the trade variable on the growth rate of GDP in three of the models estimated. 
However, the effect is not very robust (see Table 2 also). In the case of human capital as another 
control, the impact is insignificant and positive for all the models, which further confirms that 
the growth path overall for the region may be more finance and trade led. Similarly, we do not 
find any significant growth effects of labour force size or physical capital formation.  
 
The specific impacts of the financial development variables on the growth rate are as below: 
1. The results indicate that FDI affects GDP growth positively in South Asia. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the coefficient on FDI (0.140) is larger than that of coefficients of 
other potential growth determinants. This finding, that lends support to the FDI led 
growth theory, is expected since the South Asian economies have been increasingly 
adopting pro-economic liberalisation and private sector policy framework since the 
1990s (see ADB, 2003; ADB, 2012 and Government of Bangladesh, 2014 Budget 
Document). However, there are significant regulatory and country-specific differences 
which get revealed in country-specific time series study, as shown later.  
2.  The impact of total debt service is insignificant and negative on the average which is 
in contrast to the finding of the other paper on these South Asian economies-Rana and 
Barua (2015). We argue that the lack of any growth effect of total debt service reflects 
the inefficiency in the financial sector of some of these economies, particularly India 
and Pakistan (see the time series results also). For instance, Indian banks’ Net NPA 
ratio (as a percentage of net advances) have continuously increased in recent years from 
1.7% in 2012 to 8.5% in 2016 (Reserve Bank of India, 2016). On the other hand, 
nonperforming loans (as a percentage of total gross loans) have increased from 2.45% 
in 2008 to 7.6% in 2016 (World Bank, 2016).  Such trends imply a lack of efficiency 
of financial intermediation, which may have offset the potential growth effects of the 
debt channel. Reddy (2002) cites legal impediments, time-consuming nature of asset 
disposal process and manipulation by debtors using political influence as the reasons 
behind such high levels of industrial bad debts in India.  
A similar picture is observed in Pakistan too where over the last decade the percentage 
of nonperforming loans in total gross loans has mounted from 7.3% in 2006 to 11.1% 
in 2016 (World Bank, 2016). Historically, state-owned banks in these developing 
economies have channelled depositors’ money mainly to the favoured sectors, like 
agriculture sector, which has been less profitable and productive, thus adding to the 
problem of bad loans (Shaikh, 2003). Moral hazard issues like waiving of farmer loans 
before elections have also played a significant role in this regard since at times the loan 
waivers are granted primarily to rich farmers with political influence.  
3. There is a strong positive impact of the gross domestic savings on the growth rate of 
the economies at an average. This finding suggests that these economies are domestic 
investment driven at large since the banking sectors are largely devoted to allocating 
domestic savings into specific sectoral investments. 
4. Though the impact of the domestic credit provided by the banks to the private sector is 
positive on the growth, the impact is insignificant, which may also reveal that the 
impediments for the private firms for accessing financial capital are still present and 
that the government largely drives the investments in these economies.  
5. Similar insignificant positive impact is found for the domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector as a whole for the region, which is indicative of the fact that there is 
still a significant room for development for the financial sectors in these economies.   
 
The Wooldridge test indicated towards the presence of autocorrelation in the Fixed effects 
results. So, we re-estimated our model using the FGLS approach (see Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: FGLS Estimation Results, 1990-2015 
Independent Variable Coefficients 
Constant 0.586** 0.767*** -0.234 1.07** 0.250 
L1.GDP 0.085 0.096 0.041 0.089 0.092 
Trade 0.054 0.060 0.022 0.065 0.060 
Pcapital 0.141*** 0.137*** 0.028 0.143*** 0.131*** 
Hcapital 0.109 0.201 0.122 0.184 0.206 
Labour -0.022 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.001 
Inward FDI (% of GDP) 0.117**     
Total debt service (% of 
GNI) 
 -0.022    
Gross domestic savings 
(% of GDP) 
  0.470***   
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks (% of 
GDP) 
   -0.110  
Domestic credit provided 
by financial sector (% of 
GDP) 
    0.144 
Note: The dependent variable is GDP growth. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. All regressions include time trend. 
Our findings regarding the relationship between different financial variables and economic 
growth remain unchanged. As mentioned earlier, the average association between trade and 
growth for South Asia is fragile and the effect of trade disappears in the new results indicating 
its sensitivity to the choice of estimation methods. We find that, besides finance, physical 
capital accumulation has a positive relationship with GDP growth rate. Next, we conduct 
country-specific time series analysis to understand the nature of the relationship between 
different finance variables and growth for individual South Asian economies.  Granger 
causality tests have been employed to understand the short-term causality between the growth 
and finance, along with the other macroeconomic control variables.   
4.1 Bangladesh  
 
Tables 3-5 provides the Granger causality results for Bangladesh. We find that there is a 
causality running from the two financial channels namely, debt and savings towards GDP 
growth rate. There is no significant causality flowing from FDI to GDP growth. However, the 
reverse causality from GDP growth to FDI is very significant. The last finding supports the 
view that initial growth phase of any low-income country may be an important driving factor 
for further FDI flow into the economy.   
The predictability of the other macro variables is in line with the standard economic theories, 
which specifically shows that GDP growth is caused by trade, labour force size and the physical 
capital level.  
 
Table 3: Granger Causality Test Results for Bangladesh (FDI and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.007 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.017 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.803 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.008 
FDI does not cause GDP growth 0.353 
GDP growth does not cause FDI 0.078 
 
 
Table 4: Granger Causality Test Results for Bangladesh (Total Debt Services and 
Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.117 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.018 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.562 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.001 
Debt does not cause GDP growth 0.075 
 
The finding, that the Debt service level does predict the growth of GDP, can reflect the financial 
development of the economy, by suggesting that there is an allocation efficiency of the banking 
sector since the debt servicing also shows that the problem of bad debts is low. The finding 
lends support to the finance-led growth theories since the causality implies faster growth via 
returns from investments.  
Table 5: Granger Causality Test Results for Bangladesh (Saving and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.046 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.297 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.272 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.000 
Saving does not cause GDP growth 0.036 
 
 
The Table 5 results suggest that domestic savings have generated growth in the economy for 
the time period under consideration. This variable is a typical financial development variable 
for the developing economies since their growth trajectory is still in the beginning phase and 
is led by the efficient saving accumulation by the banking sector or financial sector at large.  
Overall, it can be asserted that the case of Bangladesh supports finance-growth nexus and it is 
interesting to identify a savings and debt led channel for growth which may be different from 
other economies at a similar stage of growth.  
Other finance variables such as Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP) and 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP) do not granger cause GDP growth as 
these variables came out to be insignificant with P-values 0.510 and 0.251 respectively. Since 
credit is a size measure so the lack of any effect of the credit variables may imply that the 
country needs to increase access to industrial credit for its firms as the current provisions are 
clearly not sufficient.  
 
 
4.2 India 
 
Table 6: Granger Causality Test Results for India (FDI and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.009 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.158 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.926 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.345 
FDI does not cause GDP growth 0.609 
GDP growth does not cause FDI 0.022 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Granger Causality Test Results for India (Other Finance Variables and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Debt does not cause GDP growth 0.353 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector does not cause GDP 
growth 
0.257 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks 0.701 
Saving does not cause GDP growth 0.986 
 
Tables 6 and 7 provides Granger causality results for India. Contrary to past studies (Singh, 
2008; Ray 2013), we find that financial development is not playing any role in the growth 
process of India, at least not in short run. If anything, there is a reverse causality from FDI 
towards growth implying that initial growth rates may motivate the overseas investors to invest 
in the country.  
The rate of credit formation has been increasing persistently in India. However, at the same 
time, there is a rising value of bad loans or non-performing assets in India as discussed before. 
As can also be seen in Table 8 below, on one hand, domestic credit provided by financial sector 
and that provided to private sector increased rapidly but on the other hand, total debt service 
deteriorated between 1990 and 2010 (from 2.39% to 1.49% of GDP) indicating a rise in non-
performing loans.  
 
Table 8: Selected Financial Indicators for India 
Year Total debt service (% 
of GNI) 
Domestic credit to private sector 
by banks (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit 
provided by 
financial sector (% 
of GDP) 
1990 2.39 24.49 49.97 
2000 2.26 27.85 51.18 
2010 1.49 51.14 71.94 
2015 2.34 52.23 76.75 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Hence, it can be argued that the efficiency of resource allocation is more important rather than 
the volume from the point of view of economic growth. In India, the problem of crony 
capitalism may have been partly responsible for this situation by which financial resources get 
diverted to unproductive investments thereby reducing their growth potential (see Mazumdar, 
2008 also).  
Trade seems to be the main driver of growth which is expected since India started to undertake 
major trade reforms since 1991 and rapidly opened up its economy for world trade. Applied 
Tariff rates fell from 56.4% in 1992 to 10.1% in 2013 (World Bank, 2016). In all the estimating 
equations, we failed to reject the null that Trade does not Granger cause GDP growth. We 
obtained P-values 0.018, 0.042, 0.038 and 0.040 for VAR estimations with credit, private credit 
, saving and debt respectively. Other variables such as physical capital, Human capital and 
Labour always came out to be statistically insignificant.  
 
4.3 Nepal 
Table 9: Granger Causality Test Results for Nepal (FDI and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.010 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.001 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.021 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.418 
FDI does not cause GDP growth 0.003 
GDP growth does not cause FDI 0.000 
 
There is a very significant bi-directional causality between FDI and growth, which gets support 
from the earlier studies on Nepal such as UNCTAD (2003) which says that the FDI inflows 
have been successful in job creation. Furthermore, FDI seems to be the most important 
financial development variable for Nepal which indicates that the economy is driven by a 
handful of sectors such as apparel manufacturing and tourism which depend on the FDI inflow.  
Table 10: Granger Causality Test Results for Nepal (Other Finance Variables and 
Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Debt does not cause GDP growth 0.032 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector does not cause GDP 
growth 
0.832 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks 0.301 
Saving does not cause GDP growth 0.132 
 
Table 10 reports the results for the other variables in case of Nepal, one variable which is 
significant is the Debt servicing level. As found earlier in the case of Bangladesh, this finding 
reflects that there is some level of allocation efficiency of the banking or the financial system, 
which also means less severity of the bad debt problem like that in the case of India or Pakistan.  
Among the other explanatory variables, trade and physical capital have significant predictive 
power for the future GDP growth. The former finding can be attributed to Nepal’s liberal trade 
policies. For instance, the country reduced the unweighted average rate of import tariff 
drastically from 111% in 1989 to 16% by 1992; and the number of tariff slabs fell from more 
than 100 in the 1980s to only 5 in 1996 (RIS, 2002). The human capital effect is fragile; the 
variable comes out as insignificant in all other cases and marginally significant at 10% level 
(results available upon request) when we use ‘Domestic credit to private sector by banks’ as 
the finance proxy in the VAR estimation. That is not surprising given Nepal’s niche sectors are 
tourism and agricultural products which are typically labour-intensive sectors (UNCTAD, 
2003).  
4.4 Pakistan 
Table 11: Granger Causality Test Results for Pakistan (FDI and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.437 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.273 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.000 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.000 
FDI does not cause GDP growth 0.291 
GDP growth does not cause FDI 0.014 
 
Table 12: Granger Causality Test Results for Pakistan (Other Finance Variables and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Debt does not cause GDP growth 0.417 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector does not cause GDP 
growth 
0.381 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks does not cause GDP 
growth 
0.931 
GDP growth does not cause Domestic credit to private sector by 
banks 
0.053 
Saving does not cause GDP growth 0.083 
GDP growth does not cause Saving 0.043 
 
Table 11 provides results for Granger causality between the FDI and growth variable for 
Pakistan, along with the other macro variables. Only the savings channel seem to be causing 
growth in Pakistan though the effect of the savings channel is very marginal. There is 
significant problem of crony capitalism in Pakistan as well (Shaikh, 2003) which renders some 
of the other channels like the ‘total debt service’ and credit channels ineffective. Like in the 
earlier cases of India and Bangladesh, we find a significant reverse causality between FDI and 
growth.  
Human capital and labour are very significant variables for causing GDP growth. The latter 
finding reflects characteristics of economies in the beginning phase of growth trajectories.   
 
 
 
 
4.5 Sri Lanka 
 
Table 13: Granger Causality Test Results for Sri Lanka (All Finance Variables and 
Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
FDI does not cause GDP growth 0.012 
Debt does not cause GDP growth 0.001 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector does not cause GDP 
growth 
0.002 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks 0.001 
Saving does not cause GDP growth 0.081 
 
Table 14: Granger Causality Test Results for Sri Lanka (Other Variables and Growth) 
Null Hypothesis P-value 
Finance Variable=FDI 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.318 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.007 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.075 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.033 
Finance Variable=Debt 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.064 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.083 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.112 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.278 
Finance Variable= Domestic credit provided by financial sector 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.719 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.927 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.125 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.796 
Finance Variable=Saving 
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.069 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.556 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.736 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.627 
Finance Variable= Domestic credit to private sector by banks  
Trade does not cause GDP growth 0.503 
Pcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.562 
Hcapital does not cause GDP growth 0.004 
Labour does not cause GDP growth 0.291 
 
 Among all the South Asian economies, the finance-led growth path seems to be most prominent 
in Sri Lanka. All the financial development variables are found to be significant predictors of 
the future GDP growth (Table 13). Thus, it can be argued that Sri Lanka is the classic finance 
led growth case in South Asia where the financial intermediation theory gets very good support.  
Furthermore, financial development seems to be the robust determinant of growth as the effects 
of all the other explanatory variables seem to be fragile and sensitive to model specifications. 
Table 15 summarises the findings of Granger causality analysis below. 
Table 15: Different financial channels and growth in South Asia 
Channels Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
FDI X X √ X √ 
Debt √ X √ X √ 
Domestic credit provided 
by financial sector 
X X X X √ 
Domestic credit to private 
sector by banks 
X X X X √ 
Gross domestic savings √ X X √ √ 
Note: ‘X’ denotes the absence of granger causality from financial variable towards growth and ‘√’ denotes the 
presence of the same.  
Consequently, we ask the following question: Why is the finance-led growth so pronounced in 
the case of Sri Lanka, as compared to other South Asian countries? In other words, is it a size 
effect or an efficiency effect? 
Figures 1-5 present the five financial variables (FDI, Debt, Domestic credit provided by 
financial sector, Domestic credit to private sector by banks and Gross domestic savings) for 
the five economies. 
Figure 1: FDI (% of GDP) in South Asia, 1990-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Figure 2: Total debt service (% of GNI) in South Asia, 1990-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016)  
 
 
Figure 3: Domestic credit by financial sector in South Asia, 1990-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Domestic credit to private sector in South Asia, 1990-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016)  
 
Figure 5: Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) in South Asia, 1990-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
 
Among all the South Asian economies, Pakistan seems to be the worst performer as far as 
expansion of the financial sector is concerned. We say this because, in ‘FDI’ and ‘Domestic 
credit to private sector’, the country has shown significant decline relative to the size of the 
economy, unlike the other economies which have all exhibited an upward trend during the 
considered time period. Hence, it is no surprise that we do not detect any growth effect of the 
financial variables, except savings (very marginal effect). But even savings as % of GDP has 
slightly declined over time.   
The debt services (% of GNI) reveal some interesting findings. The variable has declined for 
all the five countries with the highest decline in Pakistan (from 4.5% in 1990 to 1.3% in 2015). 
These figures probably show that the financial sectors in entire South Asia suffer from 
misallocation of resources only the extent of inefficiency differs from country to country. As 
discussed earlier, India outperforms other economies in the region in terms of volume of credit 
creation (see Figures 3-5) but the growth effects of the financial development are offset by 
problems such as crony capitalism. The most (in)famous example that can be cited here is that 
of Vijay Mallya (ex-chairman of United Spirits Ltd. and Chairman of United Breweries Group), 
one of the leading businessmen of India, who fled the country in March 2016 leaving behind 
unpaid debt worth INR 9000 crore (£1.1 million approx.) from 17 banks including government-
owned State Bank of India. More importantly, it was not a case of making a loss in business 
but of money laundering (Asthana, 2016). He had allegedly syphoned off the loan money 
abroad. None of the banks had even bothered to complain to the Central Bureau of Investigation 
(CBI) of India and only went to the court after he had escaped from India to the UK. Moreover, 
Mallya is just one amongst many. Anand (2016) reports that 29 government-owned banks 
wrote off debt worth INR 1.14 lakh crore (£13.8 billion approx.) between financial years 2013 
and 2015. According to many sources including eminent economists such as Luigi Zingales, 
the ex-governor of India’s Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India), Raghuram Rajan, was 
compelled to leave his position at RBI because he was working towards eliminating the 
inefficiency of the Indian banking system which is burdened by bad loans. This did not go 
down well with some of the big business houses and consequently, political pressure was 
deployed upon him leading to his departure (Jain et al., 2016; The Economic Times, 2016; 
Venu, 2016).  
That leaves us with a comparison between Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. We find that FDI causes 
GDP growth in Sri Lanka but not in the former. This is slightly counter-intuitive since 
Bangladesh experienced an annual average growth rate of around 4000% in inward FDI 
between 1990 and 2015 whereas Sri Lanka experienced an overall increase of around 58% 
during the same period (World Bank, 2016). However, in the case of Bangladesh, FDI has 
promoted the growth of imports (mainly that of intermediate goods) at a rate which is almost 
equal to that of exports (Hossain, 2008). That is why we do not observe any growth effect of 
FDI in Bangladesh in the short to medium run and the effect probably becomes significant only 
in the long run. Hossain (2008) says that the effect of FDI on trade balances could be negative 
in the medium run for Bangladesh depending on the relative magnitude of the two forces 
(import and export channels). Hussain and Haque (2016) also show that there is a long-run 
relationship between FDI and economic growth in the case of Bangladesh.  
Furthermore, our results indicate that credit creation is promoting growth in Sri Lanka but not 
in Bangladesh. We argue that institutional inefficiency and incidence of corruption are holding 
back Bangladesh’s financial sector. According to the Corruption Perception Index published 
yearly by Transparency International, Bangladesh (rank=25) had a much higher corruption than 
Sri Lanka (rank=37)4 in 2015. According to Worldwide Governance Indicators produced by 
World Bank, Sri Lanka also overall has the best public and legal institutions in South Asia. 
Table 16: Institutional Quality in South Asian countries 
Country  Institutional Quality 
Government Effectiveness5* Regulatory Quality6 Rule of law7 
Bangladesh -0.73 -0.93 -0.70 
India 0.10 -0.39 -0.06 
Nepal -1.04 -0.79 -0.70 
Pakistan -0.66 -0.62 -0.79 
Sri Lanka 0.01 -0.05 0.07 
Source: Kauffman et al. (2010)  
Note: *For each indicator, the score ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) institutions.  
 
The above table indicates that Bangladesh scores comprehensively below Sri Lanka, as far as 
institutional efficiency is concerned. Like in most developing countries, the financial sector in 
Bangladesh is dominated by government-owned banks. Bangladesh Krishi Bank ex-chairman 
K.I. Khaled, in his 2010 paper presented at a workshop organised by the International Business 
Forum of Bangladesh, cites political influence over loan allocations and lack of skills and 
honesty of the bank officials as the prime reasons behind corruption in the country’s banking 
sector.  Government-owned banks are vulnerable places, where governmental and politically 
influential people bring in undue pressure thus hindering the effective performance of the 
system.  
Overall, if we place the initial panel data analysis against the country specific Granger causality 
analysis, one fact is clarified that the average results cannot predict the heterogeneity obtained 
in the latter findings. There are different growth trajectories for every country in South Asia 
thus necessitating country-specific policy recommendations. Moreover, the extent of 
corruption and institutional quality differs significantly across the countries which, in turn, 
affect the effectiveness of the financial development. In the context of finance-led growth, the 
findings of this paper are in line with the findings of early papers such as Rioja and Valev 
(2004) who show that growth effects of financial sector vary significantly across regions and 
one size fit all policy, therefore, may not promote economic development in all countries. 
                                                          
4 Corruption Perception index by Transparency International-100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).  
5 Government Effectiveness=Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
6 Regulatory Quality=Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
7 Rule of law=Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 5. Conclusion 
 
The paper examines the empirical relationship between financial development and economic 
growth for five South Asian countries over the time period 1990-2015. The panel model results 
indicate that financial development promotes growth in South Asia through the FDI and 
savings channels. The other channels are not contributing towards growth for the overall 
region. In fact, we find the effect of total debt service to be negative (though insignificant) 
which is probably driven by India and Pakistan. In these two countries, the problem of bad debt 
is a serious issue as non-performing assets (as a percentage of net advances) and non-
performing loans (as a percentage of total gross loans) have been exhibiting an upward trend 
over the last decade or so.  
The Granger causality analysis clearly depicts the heterogeneity in the region, as far as the 
finance-growth nexus is concerned. Sri Lanka comes out as a very good case for the financial 
sector led growth theory as there is a causality running from all the financial variables, that this 
study considers, towards economic growth. We argue this is because Sri Lanka has lower 
corruption and better legal and government institutions as compared to all other South Asian 
economies, thus making it possible for the country to take better advantage of the expansion of 
its domestic financial sector.  
Quantitatively speaking, Bangladesh is experiencing a faster growth in most of the financial 
variables (such as FDI) as compared to Sri Lanka but corruption and government 
ineffectiveness are holding it back from realising the growth effects from all the financial 
channels.  
In terms of overall growth of credit and domestic savings, India outperforms all its neighbours. 
But the econometric results indicate that financial development does not cause growth in India, 
at least not in the short run. This finding bears testimony to the fact that mere credit formation 
will not be sufficient to boost growth. The Indian policymakers need to address the issue of 
misallocation of resources resulting from crony capitalism to ensure that the funds are allocated 
to profitable investments. The most important determinant of growth during the considered 
time period seems to be trade openness which is expected because India started adopting 
widespread trade reforms from 1991 onwards.  
Pakistan seems to be the worst performer in the region, as far as development of the financial 
sector is concerned. The volume of credit creation, FDI and savings (as % of GDP or GNI) are 
shrinking over time, unlike all the other South Asian countries who are exhibiting an upward 
trend. We find that financial sector promotes growth in Pakistan only through the savings 
channel but the effect is very marginal. Moreover like India, Pakistan suffers from gross 
misallocation of resources thus rendering both size and efficiency effect of financial 
development ineffective.  
Besides Sri Lanka, Nepal seems to be the only country in the sample where FDI causes growth. 
UNCTAD (2003) also observes in its Investment Policy Review report that FDI inflows have 
been successful in job creation in the labour-intensive manufacturing sectors (such as textiles 
and garment) and tourism of Nepal. However, the level of FDI is still very low in Nepal; it was 
only about 1% of GDP in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). So, the country should consider further 
opening up its economy to foreign investments to boost productivity and growth. Among other 
findings, there is strong evidence of reverse causality from FDI towards growth in South Asia 
which can be generalised to infer that, for developing countries, some level of initial GDP 
growth is necessary for building up a credible investment climate and attracting foreign 
investors. 
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